Doyle J
250221 Skye Assets Fund SPC (in voluntary liquidation) – FSD 93 of 2021 (DDJ) - Judgment
IN THE GRAND COURT OF THE CAYMAN ISLANDS
FINANCIAL SERVICES DIVISION
Neutral Citation Number: [2025] CIGC (FSD) 14
CAUSE NO. FSD 93 of 2021 (DDJ)
IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES ACT (2021 REVISION)
AND
IN THE MATTER OF SKYE ASSETS FUND SPC (In Voluntary Liquidation)
Before:
The Hon. Justice David Doyle
Heard:
On the papers
Draft Judgment circulated:
18 February 2025
Judgment delivered:
21 February 2025
Determination of issues in respect of costs
JUDGMENT
1.
On 17 February 2025 the matter was reassigned to me.
2.
I have considered:
(1)
The judgment of former Chief Justice Anthony Smellie delivered on 30 June 2021 (the
“Judgment”).
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Digitally signed by Advance Performance Exponents
Inc
Date: 2025.02.21 14:29:34 -05:00
Reason: Apex Certified
Location: Apex
250221 Skye Assets Fund SPC (in voluntary liquidation) – FSD 93 of 2021 (DDJ) - Judgment
(2)
A summons dated 13 July 2021 (the “Summons”) where Mr Du Ki Hong (the “Voluntary
Liquidator”) seeks the following orders:
(a)
Mr Kiu Kim (the “Petitioner”) shall pay the Voluntary Liquidator’s costs of the
proceedings on the indemnity basis, alternatively the standard basis, to be assessed
if not agreed;
(b)
Notwithstanding paragraph (1), the Petitioner shall pay the Voluntary Liquidator’s
costs of the Summons on the standard basis, to be assessed if not agreed.
(3)
The 6 pages of written submissions of the Voluntary Liquidator dated 27 July 2021.
(4)
The 3 pages of written submissions of the Petitioner dated 27 July 2021.
3.
The Petitioner does not dispute that costs should follow the event but he submits that they should
not be on the indemnity basis.
4.
I have carefully considered the Judgment. In particular, former Chief Justice Smellie:
(1)
at [36] stated “Viewed objectively and in the round, it became apparent from all the
circumstances, that [the Petitioner’s] resort to the process of the Court (both for the Deferral
Application and ultimately the supervision order) was abusive. His real objective was to
leverage a position of advantage in his proposed claim, not so much against the Company
itself which had no assets, but personally against Mr Hong”;
(2)
at [37] commented to the effect that the Petitioner “had no remaining proprietary interest
in the Company whose dissolution he wished to defer” and “There was no apparent basis
upon which his claim could be regarded as aimed at recovering assets belonging to the
Company…”;
(3)
at [40] stated “[The Petitioner’s] objectives would be anathema to the statutory rationale
for deferral of dissolution … [The Petitioner’s] claim may fairly be described as
“shadowy” and his pleadings as patently lacking in merit – both as regards the deferral of
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