Peters J
```html <table> <tr> <td>1</td> <td>IN THE GRAND COURT OF THE CAYMAN ISLANDS</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2</td> <td>Criminal Division</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3</td> </tr> <tr> <td>4</td> </tr> <tr> <td>5</td> <td>Neutral Citation Number：[2025] CIGC (Crim) 8</td> </tr> <tr> <td>6</td> </tr> <tr> <td>7</td> <td>IND. No. 59 & 78/23</td> </tr> <tr> <td>8</td> </tr> <tr> <td>9</td> </tr> <tr> <td>10</td> <td>THE KING</td> </tr> <tr> <td>11</td> <td>V</td> </tr> <tr> <td>12</td> <td>DEVON WRIGHT</td> </tr> <tr> <td>13</td> <td>&</td> </tr> <tr> <td>14</td> <td>JAMES MCLEAN</td> </tr> <tr> <td>15</td> </tr> <tr> <td>16</td> <td>Appearances：</td> <td>Ms. Shauna-Kaye James，Crown Counsel for the Prosecution</td> </tr> <tr> <td>17</td> <td>Ms. Amelia Fosuhene for Defendant，James McLean</td> </tr> <tr> <td>18</td> <td>Mr. Jonathon Hughes for Defendant，Devon Wright</td> </tr> <tr> <td>19</td> </tr> <tr> <td>20</td> <td>Before：</td> <td>Hon. Justice Emma Peters</td> </tr> <tr> <td>21</td> </tr> <tr> <td>22</td> <td>Heard：</td> <td>17 February 2025</td> </tr> <tr> <td>23</td> </tr> <tr> <td>24</td> <td>Ruling：</td> <td>21 February 2025</td> </tr> <tr> <td>25</td> </tr> <tr> <td>26</td> </tr> <tr> <td>27al Law-Ap stay of prn abuse of p</td> <td>9</td> <td>al interv</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2n witness ur 40 due to orocess.Exc</td> <td>2</td> <td>es of pre</td> </tr> <tr> <td>28</td> <td>Crimimplication toceedings alusion of ev</td> <td>25</td> <td>tri</td> </tr> <tr> <td>29</td> <td>of mainder sectionircumstas avidence</td> <td>inc</td> </tr> <tr> <td>30</td> </tr> </table> Page 1 of 12 ```
```html <table> <tr> <td>1</td> <td>RULING</td> <td>GRAND COUNTY</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2</td> <td>Introduction</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3</td> </tr> <tr> <td>4</td> <td>1.</td> <td>An application was made by the defence (Mr. Hughes for DW and Ms. Fosuhene for JM)</td> </tr> <tr> <td>5</td> <td>for this matter to be stayed as an Abuse of the Process of the Court or, in the alternative,</td> </tr> <tr> <td>6</td> <td>for the evidence of Romario Brown to be excluded under s40 of the Evidence Act (2021</td> </tr> <tr> <td>7</td> <td>Revision). The fact that Mr. Brown’s evidence is so crucial in the case (as has already been</td> </tr> <tr> <td>8</td> <td>acknowledged in previous legal submissions and rulings) meant that acceding to either</td> </tr> <tr> <td>9</td> <td>limb of the argument would be to bring an end to this trial. Counsel agreed that if I decided</td> </tr> <tr> <td>10</td> <td>to refuse the application then we would proceed to complete the evidence of the main</td> </tr> <tr> <td>11</td> <td>witness with my reasons to follow later.</td> </tr> <tr> <td>12</td> <td>History</td> </tr> <tr> <td>13</td> </tr> <tr> <td>14</td> <td>2.</td> <td>The chronology of this case is relevant and the history of the way in which the proceedings</td> </tr> <tr> <td>15</td> <td>have developed merits close consideration. The indictment alleges 3 burglaries (one</td> </tr> <tr> <td>16</td> <td>aggravated, two basic) in January/February of 2022. Devon Wright (DW) is charged with</td> </tr> <tr> <td>17</td> <td>all 3 counts, James McLean (JM) is charged with the second and third counts. The witness</td> </tr> <tr> <td>18</td> <td>Romario Brown (RB) has already pleaded guilty to all 3 counts and has been sentenced-</td> </tr> <tr> <td>19</td> <td>a sentence that he is still now serving.</td> </tr> <tr> <td>20</td> </tr> <tr> <td>21</td> <td>3.</td> <td>When RB was first arrested and interviewed in Feb 2022 he denied involvement in these</td> </tr> <tr> <td>22</td> <td>allegations. He was interviewed on two further occasions in Feb 2022 and in those</td> </tr> <tr> <td>23</td> <td>interviews, he implicated DW and JM, explaining that they had all committed the offences</td> </tr> <tr> <td>24</td> <td>together. He then later in 2022 made two witness statements further implicating the two</td> </tr> <tr> <td>25</td> <td>defendants.</td> </tr> <tr> <td>26</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2</td> <td>In Septemthe first tria</td> <td>al must be a P</td> <td>on Justiced</td> </tr> <tr> <td>7</td> <td>4.</td> <td>per 2024 at 1 of these md when RB</td> <td>2jury that he defendan</td> <td>ng so thee C</td> </tr> <tr> <td>29</td> <td>that the tri</td> <td>2 that the tri</td> <td>nd that b</td> </tr> <tr> <td>30</td> <td>the same thing in effect happened.</td> </tr> </table> 250221 R. v Devon Wright & James McLean: Ind. 59 & 78/23, Coram Peters J. - Ruling Page 2 of 12
That being so Romario Brown has now given a number of accounts of events in various circumstances.
On 14 Feb 2025 (the Friday before this case was listed for a third trial) Ms. James (Crown counsel) and Ms. McNiven (witness care officer) visited RB in HMP to conduct a pretrial interview (PTI). It is the content and circumstances of that PTI that has led to this application about which I heard submissions on the morning of day 3 of the trial.
RB completed his evidence in chief on day 2 (18.2.25) and in the afternoon I was asked to postpone cross examination given that defence counsel both expressed their surprise at the apparent improvement in the cogency and cohesiveness of RB’s evidence and asked for further information. That led to questions being asked about what had happened at the PTI on 14.2.2025. Overnight, a note was provided by Ms. McNiven about her recollection of events and I decided on 19.2.25 to require Ms. James to do the same. I had, at first, not wanted to ask Ms. James for such information in order that there could be no argument that she had become a witness but given Ms. McNiven’s note was silent as to what, if anything, RB had said at that PTI it became necessary to require Ms. James’ note too. In any event I concluded based upon the principles set out in the Carter case cited by Mr. Hughes (see citation below) that there was a good argument that she was not a witness. The application for a stay as an abuse of process
In Mr. Hughes’ written submissions provided to me on 19.2.2025 (the document being entitled “defence note on recent developments”) he asserts that the alleged improvement in the cogency of RB’s evidence at this trial (trial 3) creates a suspicion that the content of the PTI mectively co submits (at para 4) to occasion URB has given him its timeie i ay have effached him but this is t He submits as apper consistenl upon which P n evident it antant ndictmer provided on 18.2.25 saying: 250221 R. v Devon Wright & James McLean: Ind. 59 & 78/23, Coram Peters J. – Ruling Page 3 of 12 ```
```html <table> <tr> <td>1</td> <td>"I do recall that Counsel reminded the witness to recall the dates and the sequence of events whilst he was reading his statement as it wasn’t in order".</td> </tr> <tr> <td>9.</td> <td>He notes that in her note of that same interview (provided on 19.2.2025), Ms. James says that she did not recall reminding him of the sequence of events whilst reading the statement and she cannot say exactly what was said to him.</td> </tr> <tr> <td>10.</td> <td>Mr. Hughes says that, in the absence of a proper note of that meeting especially when the witness has already given evidence at two previous trials, to urge him to pay attention to any particular aspect of his evidence amounts in effect to coaching which, under the well-known principles as set out in R v Momodou 2005 EWCA Crim 177 (where the (then) Judge LJ pointed out the dramatic distinction between witness coaching and witness familiarization) is prohibited.</td> </tr> <tr> <td>11.</td> <td>Mr. Hughes for DW and Ms. Fosuhene for JM both expressly accept that they make no suggestion of any mala fides on the part of Ms. James but they do say that the visit and the content of that meeting could have even subconsciously caused RB to appreciate which parts of his evidence required improvement.</td> </tr> <tr> <td>12.</td> <td>That being so, Mr. Hughes suggests that I should stay the proceedings as an abuse both on the basis of the assertion that a fair trial is no longer possible and on the basis that a stay is necessary to protect the integrity of the criminal justice system both in perception and in reality.</td> </tr> <tr> <td>13.</td> <td>Ms. Fosuhene adopted Mr. Hughes submissions but also made the point that Ms. James was present at a conversation where she (Ms. James) knew what was said by the witness but no one trial does. Tut as unfortunat</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2</td> <td>overnight icNiven does wit what said</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2</td> <td>It was that concern that led me to order Ms. James to write a note of what had</td> </tr> <tr> <td>30</td> <td>been said. I concluded given the case of R v Carter and Douglas [2006] CILR 421) that to</td> </tr> </table> ```
```html <table> <tr> <td>1</td> <td>do so would not place her in the position of being a potential witness with the obvious</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2</td> <td>consequences for this trial.</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3</td> <td>14. Both defence counsel say that in the context of the history of this case that any PTI</td> </tr> <tr> <td>4</td> <td>conducted at HMP with RB should have been most carefully noted - more so than had this</td> </tr> <tr> <td>5</td> <td>been a run of the mill PTI prior to a first trial. I entirely accept that it would have been far</td> </tr> <tr> <td>6</td> <td>preferable had this PTI been better noted and recorded than in fact it was.</td> </tr> <tr> <td>7</td> </tr> <tr> <td>9</td> <td>The Law re Abuse of Process</td> </tr> <tr> <td>10</td> </tr> <tr> <td>11</td> <td>15. The burden of establishing a stay of the indictment on the basis of an abuse of process is</td> </tr> <tr> <td>12</td> <td>on the defence and they must satisfy the court that a stay is necessary on the balance of</td> </tr> <tr> <td>13</td> <td>probabilities. In the leading case of Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court ex parte Bennett</td> </tr> <tr> <td>14</td> <td>[1994] 1 AC 42 the court held that the discretion to grant a stay “must be exercised carefully</td> </tr> <tr> <td>15</td> <td>and sparingly and only for very compelling reasons. The discretion to stay is not a</td> </tr> <tr> <td>16</td> <td>disciplinary jurisdiction and ought not to be exercised in order to express the court’s</td> </tr> <tr> <td>17</td> <td>disapproval of official conduct”</td> </tr> <tr> <td>18</td> </tr> <tr> <td>19</td> <td>16. In Maxwell [2010] UKSC 48 at para 13 Lord Dyson identified the two categories of case</td> </tr> <tr> <td>20</td> <td>in which the court has the power to stay proceedings for abuse of process:</td> </tr> <tr> <td>21</td> <td>(1) First, where it will be impossible to give the accused a fair trial, and</td> </tr> <tr> <td>22</td> <td>(2) Second, where it offends the court’s sense of justice and propriety to be asked to try</td> </tr> <tr> <td>23</td> <td>the accused in the particular circumstances of the case.</td> </tr> <tr> <td>24</td> </tr> <tr> <td>25</td> <td>17. Each category has become known as category 1 and category 2 abuse. The defence in this</td> </tr> <tr> <td>26</td> <td>case rely on both. It is rare for there to be legitimate grounds to stay proceedings on the</td> </tr> <tr> <td>27</td> <td>2 cases (of ware many) b in ded by H21</td> </tr> <tr> <td>28</td> <td>Category 2 this was of Red 8</td> <td>which there out each Ian</td> </tr> <tr> <td>29</td> <td>para 66.</td> </tr> <tr> <td>30</td> </tr> </table> Page 5 of 12
These principles were also affirmed and applied in BKR [2023] EWCA Crim 903 and more recently in R v Ng and O'Reilly [2024] EWCA Crim 493 at paras 20 to 25.
In the Attorney-General of Jersey [2011] UKPC 10 at [24] it was said by Lord Dyson that an abuse of the second category requires a discretionary balancing of the particular offence charged and the particular conduct complained of, with relevant considerations including the seriousness of any violation of a defendant's rights and the seriousness of the offence charged. Lord Dyson went on to say at [25-26], that how the discretion is exercised will depend on the particular circumstances of the case, that rigid classifications are undesirable, and that:
"... the balance must always be struck between the public interest in ensuring that those who are accused of serious crimes should be tried and the competing public interest in ensuring that executive misconduct does not undermine public confidence in the criminal justice system and bring it into disrepute."
The power to stay criminal proceedings as an abuse of process is an important though exceptional remedy which is to be exercised with care and restraint. A stay of proceedings is considered to be the exception rather than the rule and is a measure of last resort. I put those broad principles of law to defence counsel who accepted their accuracy
The two species of abuse justifying a stay are separate and distinct. The first is when a fair trial is not possible. The second is where it offends the court's sense of justice and propriety, or public confidence in the criminal justice system would be undermined, for the defendant to be tried in the particular circumstances of the case. The abuse must amount to an affront to the public conscience.
A category only applies to cases of public interest where the prosecution has engaged in misconduct, and that such abuse is by its nature very rare because they
R. v Devon Wright & James McLean: Ind. 59 & 78/23, Coram Peters J. – Ruling ## Page 7 of 12
are "very exceptional" when something out of the ordinary has occurred. There is a two-stage approach when considering Category 2 abuse.
First, it must be determined whether and in what respect the prosecutor has been guilty of misconduct, such as very serious examples of malpractice and unlawfulness as opposed to incompetence or negligence.
Secondly, it must be determined whether such misconduct justifies a stay on the ground of abuse of process. This requires an evaluation of the particular facts and circumstances of each case, weighing the public interest in ensuring that those charged with crimes should be tried, against the competing public interest in maintaining confidence in the criminal justice system.
It is submitted in this case that there was no proper and full record made of the Pre Trial Interview (PTI) and that therefore the lack of proper record in effect amounts to a failure of disclosure by the Crown as they ought to have recorded the entirety of that PTI meeting and disclosed it. I therefore observe that a stay on the grounds of non-disclosure, in Category 2 abuse, would require errors in disclosure to reach the level of grave executive misconduct such that they would undermine public confidence in the criminal justice system and bring it into disrepute.
Cases such as R v F [2011] EWCA Crim 1844, and Stephen Paul S [2006] EWCA Crim 756 set out all the necessary principles. However, each case has to be determined on its own facts. Some general principles and factors can however be set out:
a. where there is no fault on the part of the complainant or the prosecution, it will be verstay to be granted, so the
b. no be granted as prejudic
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3. stay should in the abio
no fair trial can be held, and **Grand Court of the Cayman Islands** **Criminal Division**
```html <table> <tr> <td>1</td> <td>c. within that decision a judge has power to regulate the regulate the admissibility of</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2</td> <td>evidence and</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3</td> <td>d. the trial process itself should ensure that all relevant factual issues can be placed</td> </tr> <tr> <td>4</td> <td>before the jury for their consideration in accordance with appropriate directions</td> </tr> <tr> <td>5</td> <td>from the judge.</td> </tr> <tr> <td>6</td> <td>27. In order to grant a stay, unfairness to the defendant is not required; rather the focus should</td> </tr> <tr> <td>8</td> <td>be on whether the court's sense of justice and propriety is offended or public confidence in</td> </tr> <tr> <td>9</td> <td>the criminal justice system would be undermined. Equally, a stay should not be imposed</td> </tr> <tr> <td>10</td> <td>for the purpose of punishing or disciplining prosecutorial misconduct. The focus must be</td> </tr> <tr> <td>11</td> <td>on whether a stay is appropriate in order to safeguard the integrity of the criminal justice</td> </tr> <tr> <td>12</td> <td>system. It follows that if, having considered all these factors, a judge's assessment is that a</td> </tr> <tr> <td>13</td> <td>fair trial will be possible, a stay should not be granted.</td> </tr> <tr> <td>14</td> <td>15</td> <td>28. I wish to make clear at this stage that having considered all of that advanced by counsel, to</td> </tr> <tr> <td>16</td> <td>whom I am very grateful for their assistance, this is a case where it cannot on any analysis</td> </tr> <tr> <td>17</td> <td>of what happened at the PTI be said to be impossible for a fair trial to take place. Counsel</td> </tr> <tr> <td>18</td> <td>can explore what the witness says about his varying accounts and can put the impact of</td> </tr> <tr> <td>19</td> <td>the PTI to him it will then be for the jury to determine whether (give the crucial / decisive</td> </tr> <tr> <td>20</td> <td>nature of his evidence) they can be sure of his evidence as to the involvement of the two</td> </tr> <tr> <td>21</td> <td>defendants.</td> </tr> <tr> <td>22</td> <td>23</td> <td>29. Failing to obtain evidence, lost opportunity in preserving evidence and losing or destroying</td> </tr> <tr> <td>24</td> <td>evidence is an area often relied on in applications for granting a stay of an indictment. In</td> </tr> <tr> <td>25</td> <td>the Feltham Magistrates' Court case [2001] EWHC Admin 130, the court suggested that an</td> </tr> <tr> <td>26</td> <td>inquiry into abuse of process might necessarily involve exploration of the nature and extent</td> </tr> <tr> <td>27</td> <td>of the invauthorities'dobtain and</td> </tr> <tr> <td>28</td> <td>estigating auty, if any</td> </tr> <tr> <td>29</td> <td>lairness to the defendant and the prosecution, but again consideration must be given to</td> </tr> </table> Page 8 of 12 ```
```markdown whether the trial process itself is equipped to deal with the bulk of the complaints on which applications for a stay are founded.
Mr. Hughes cites the case of Momodou in his skeleton argument but there is nothing in the case of Momodou [2005] EWCA Crim 177, to suggest a stay for an abuse should be ordered except in exceptional cases. To properly apply the principles derived in Momodou it has been necessary for me to reach a factual conclusion as to whether the content of the PTI went beyond the proper realms of a PTI and strayed into coaching or not.
Let me be clear that I agree with the defence that a greater level of record keeping and note taking would have been desirable and sensible in a PTI in a case with the history with which we are dealing here. However, I am entirely satisfied on what I have seen and heard that to draw the witness' attention to the fact that his main witness statement deals with matters in reverse order is within the proper realms of assisting a witness at a PTI (esp one with the relatively low levels of intelligence that psychiatric reports in this case show are relevant to this witness).
I do not find on the basis of the evidence I have seen regarding that PTI that anything notable or disclosable was said by this witness at that meeting. I accept that whilst the record keeping has not been of the highest standard, that if anything had been said that was in any way of note then it would have been recorded.
So far as the dates are concerned, I do not agree that this is the only occasion that he has given evidence consistent with the dates in the indictment. I accept and agree that he has varied in his account re the dates to some extent. But as I noted several times during the oral submissions, the dates are not a material averment. RB's evidence of there being 3 burglaries insistent and the actual dates is at 21 the jury winsider when acting his card reliability is a matter of concern. I wish to confirm determined that there is no evidence anywhere close to satisfying the high standard necessary to justify a stay for abuse. ``` This text is a transcription of the content visible on the page, formatted with Markdown for headings and paragraph structure, HTML for tables, and LaTeX for math, as requested.
Conclusion re Abuse
First it must be determined whether and in what respects the prosecutorial authorities have been guilty of misconduct. Secondly it must be determined whether such misconduct justifies staying the proceedings as an abuse. It is at the second of those stages the court must evaluate the competing public interests.
I do not consider that the prosecution has committed any wrong here. The highest the facts of this case go is to suggest that better note taking would have avoided this issue arising. The Crown told the witness to look at the dates when he refreshed his memory as his statement set out the events in reverse order. Those are details that do not amount to material averments. But it goes no further than that. Is his evidence better or less confused due to him being told that in the PTI or because he has had so much practice now that whilst he remains someone who makes inconsistent statements regarding certain perhaps more important details, he is now quite good at remembering the likely dates (dates of events that after all he has pleaded guilty to)? There is no impropriety by the Crown and nor is there any unfairness to the defence. It is not unfair to try the defendant. The trial process will enable the defence to use the various iterations of the witness' evidence to explore his credibility fully. That is proper. But it goes no further than that. In summary, there are no circumstances meeting the high threshold of exceptionality such as justifying a stay of the proceedings as an abuse of the court process. # The application to exclude the witness' evidence
In the alternative, the defence submits that I should exclude the evidence of RB under section 40 of the Evidence Act (2021 Revision) which provides: \begin{table}[h] \centering \begin{tabular}{|c|c|} \hline \textbf{Section 40} & \textbf{Description} \\ \hline \end{tabular} \caption{Section 40 of the Evidence Act (2021 Revision)} \end{table} 250221 R. v Devon Wright & James McLean: Ind. 59 & 78/23, Coram Peters J. – Ruling Page 10 of 12
```html <table> <tr> <td>1</td> <td>40. Nothing in this Act derogates from the power of a court in any criminal</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2</td> <td>proceeding to disallow evidence otherwise admissible which, in the opinion of such</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3</td> <td>court, would, if allowed, operate unfairly against an accused person"</td> </tr> <tr> <td>4</td> </tr> <tr> <td>5</td> <td>37. At its highest, on the basis of my assessment of the evidence I have heard, I find the defence</td> </tr> <tr> <td>6</td> <td>criticism amounts to drawing the witness' attention to the dates. I say again - the dates are</td> </tr> <tr> <td>7</td> <td>not a material averment. I have reminded myself of the relevant principles and case law</td> </tr> <tr> <td>8</td> <td>that would apply to an application under section 40 EA.</td> </tr> <tr> <td>9</td> </tr> <tr> <td>10</td> <td>38. I considered the principles derived from the case of Samuel [1988] 87 Cr App R 232 which</td> </tr> <tr> <td>11</td> <td>held that it is undesirable to attempt general guidance when dealing with a judge's</td> </tr> <tr> <td>12</td> <td>discretion in respect of an exclusionary power such as that contained in the similar</td> </tr> <tr> <td>13</td> <td>provision under s78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. Every such application</td> </tr> <tr> <td>14</td> <td>must be considered on its merits by a Judge.</td> </tr> <tr> <td>15</td> </tr> <tr> <td>16</td> <td>39. I conclude that the standard for the exclusion of evidence in respect of section 40 would</td> </tr> <tr> <td>17</td> <td>not require there to be any impropriety on the part of the prosecution, the power to exclude</td> </tr> <tr> <td>18</td> <td>would be exercisable if I considered that admitting it would operate unfairly against either</td> </tr> <tr> <td>19</td> <td>or both defendants.</td> </tr> <tr> <td>20</td> </tr> <tr> <td>21</td> <td>40. In my view the circumstances in this case fall far short of coming close to justifying the</td> </tr> <tr> <td>22</td> <td>exclusion of the evidence for the same reasons as I set out regarding the abuse limb of the</td> </tr> <tr> <td>23</td> <td>application. The trial process is well equipped to deal with the previous inconsistent</td> </tr> <tr> <td>24</td> <td>statements made by this witness. The jury is well placed then to assess his evidence for its</td> </tr> <tr> <td>25</td> <td>strengths and weaknesses.</td> </tr> <tr> <td>26</td> </tr> <tr> <td>27</td> <td>28</td> </tr> <tr> <td>29</td> <td>29</td> </tr> <tr> <td>30</td> </tr> </table> 250221 R. v Devon Wright & James McLean: Ind. 59 & 78/23, Coram Peters J. - Ruling Page 11 of 12 ```
```html <table> <tr> <td>1</td> <td>41. That being so I order that this case now continue and I refuse the defence applications.</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3</td> <td>Dated the 21st day of February 2025</td> </tr> <tr> <td>4</td> </tr> <tr> <td>5</td> </tr> <tr> <td>6</td> </tr> <tr> <td>7</td> </tr> <tr> <td>8</td> </tr> <tr> <td>9</td> <td>The Hon. Justice Emma Peters</td> </tr> <tr> <td>10</td> <td>Judge of the Grand Court</td> </tr> </table> ``` ```latex \begin{table} \begin{tabular}{|c|c|} \hline 1 & 41. That being so I order that this case now continue and I refuse the defence applications. \\ \hline 2 & \\ \hline 3 & Dated the 21st day of February 2025 \\ \hline 4 & \\ \hline 5 & \\ \hline 6 & \\ \hline 7 & \\ \hline 8 & \\ \hline 9 & The Hon. Justice Emma Peters \\ \hline 10 & Judge of the Grand Court \\ \hline \end{tabular} \end{table}