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Judgment

Federal Express Cayman Ltd v The Caymanian Protection Board and The Attorney General - Order

G 0165/1989 · 1989-08-22

Extension of time for certiorari application; Interpretation of Grand Court Rules - discretion under rule 2(4); Avoiding prejudice to concurrent mandamus proceedings; Beneficial construction of procedural rules

Full metadata
Cause Number G 0165/1989
Court CIGC (Civ)
Judge Collett CJ
Parties Federal Express Cayman Ltd v The Caymanian Protection Board and The Attorney General - Order
Judgment Date 1989-08-22
Subject Extension of time for certiorari application; Interpretation of Grand Court Rules - discretion under rule 2(4); Avoiding prejudice to concurrent mandamus proceedings; Beneficial construction of procedural rules
Filename (current) 89-08-22-Federal-Express-v-The-Caymanian-Protection-Board.pdf
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In the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands — Civil Division
Cause No. G 0165/1989
Between
Federal Express Cayman Ltd
- v -
The Caymanian Protection Board and The Attorney General - Order
Before
Collett CJ
Judgment delivered 1989-08-22

IN THE GRAND COURT OF THE CAYMAN ISLANDS
HOLDEN AT GEORGE TOWN, GRAND CAYMAN
IN CHAMBERS

BEFORE THE HON. THE CHIEF JUSTICE
ON 19TH AUGUST, 1989
CAUSE # 165/89

BETWEEN
FEDERAL EXPRESS CAYMAN LIMITED
AND
THE CAYMANIAN PROTECTION BOARD
AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
RESPONDENT

Mr. A. Turner for the Applicant
Mr. A. Smellie for the Respondent

APPLICATION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME

ORDER

I agree with both Counsel that a beneficial construction ought to be given to rule 3 when read together with rule 2(4) of the Grand Court (Application for Orders of Mandamus Prohibition Certiorari and Habeas Corpus) Rules. Although the specific exception to the requirement that applications for certiorari must be begun within 6 months, which appeared in the English rule on which rule 3 was modelled are not repeated in the Cayman Rule, this omission seems naturally to follow the inclusion of rule 2(4) which gives a general discretion to a judge to extend time generally under the Rules. In view of that provision the specific exception would have been tautological.

I therefore hold that I have jurisdiction to extend time here if the circumstances are such that it is reasonable to do so. In this case the delay in making application is shown to have been due to the correspondence which followed the making of the Cayman Islands Protection Board decision in question as to
whether or not a right of appeal to the Governor lay. Following that correspondence such an appeal was in fact pursued by the Applicant but unsuccessfully. It would be undesirable and unfair that applicants generally for certiorari in such cases should be placed in a situation in which in order to conform to strict time limits they might be compelled to forego a right of appeal to the Governor or else risk being out of time for application to this Court.

Another good reason for granting extension of time here is that the refusal of Harre J. to grant leave to apply for certiorari in the original application was coupled with a grant of leave to apply for mandamus in respect of the same subject matter. That application for mandamus is due to be heard on 3rd October 1989 and its outcome could be prejudiced by the inability of the applicant to move at the same time for Certiorari.

For these reasons I accede to the application for extension of time in which to apply for leave to move for an order of Certiorari and such leave is also granted pursuant to the present application.

G. COLLET.

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